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The Continuing Saga of
the Home Office Deduction
Commissioner v. Soliman'
I. INTRODUCTION
The deductibility of expenditures associated with home offices is an issue
of great concern to many taxpayers. Unfortunately, the standards that have
evolved to determine the deductibility of home office expenses are anything
but clear. In Commissioner v. Soliman, the Supreme Court was presented with
the opportunity to add a degree of certainty to this area of tax law. This Note
will examine the Court's decision in Soliman and conclude that the Court did
not take advantage of the opportunity presented to it. This Note will also
assess the relative merits of several tests used for determining the deductibility
of home office expenses and recommend a test that would give this area of the
law a degree of certainty.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Nader Soliman, a self-employed anesthesiologist, was a sole proprietor
from January 1, 1983 to August 31, 1983.2 He incorporated on August 6,
1983, and the corporation, Nader Soliman, M.D., P.C., began its fiscal year
on September 1, 1983.' "During 1983, [he] worked as an anesthesiologist at
Suburban Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland, Shady Grove Hospital in Rockville,
Maryland, and Loudon Memorial Hospital in Leesburg, Virginia."4  He
administered anesthesiato patients before surgery, cared for them immediately
after surgery, and treated them for pain.5 All of these services were
performed in the hospitals.6 His work at the hospitals totaled thirty to thirty-
five hours per week.' Approximately eighty percent of that time was spent
at Suburban Hospital, and most of the remaining time was spent at Loudon
1. 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
2. Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20, 21 (1990), affd, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir.
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Memorial Hospital.' Soliman was not provided with an office at any of the
three hospitals?
During 1983, Soliman lived in a condominium in McLean, Virginia.'0
He used one bedroom exclusively as an office." He spent two to three hours
per day in the bedroom office performing such tasks as "contacting patients,
surgeons, and hospitals by telephone; maintaining billing records and patient
logs;" preparing for specific patients; preparing monthly presentations for post
anesthesia care nurses; "satisfying continuing medical education requirements;
and reading medical journals and books."'" "[H]e did not meet patients in
the home office."' 3
Soliman claimed deductions on his 1983 federal income tax return, under
section 280A of the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter "I.R.C."), 14 for the
portion of the condominium fees, utilities, and depreciation allocable to the
home office. 5 These deductions were disallowed upon audit, based on the
Commissioner's "determination that the home office was not Soliman's
principal place of business."'
16
The Tax Court ruled that the deductions for Soliman's home office were
allowable because it was his principal place of business."7 In reaching its
holding, the court abandoned the focal point test it had enunciated in Bale v.
Commissioner8 for determining a taxpayer's principal place of business
under I.R.C. section 280A(c)(1)(A). 9 In its place, the court opted for an
inquiry into the surrounding facts and circumstances." Using this approach,
the court found that Soliman's home office was essential to his business, that
he spent substantial time there, and that no other location was available to
8. Id.
9. Id.




14. I.R.C. § 280A (1988). See infra note 77 for the text of § 280A.
15. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 704.
16. Id
17. Soliman, 94 T.C. at 29.
18. 74 T.C. 105 (1980).
19. Soliman, 94 T.C. at 24-25. As will be seen infra, the focal point test used to
determine a taxpayer's principal place of business concentrates on the place where
revenues are generated and goods and services are provided to customers. See Drucker
v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605, 613-14 (1982), rev'don other grounds, 715 F.2d 67
(2d Cir. 1983).
20. Soliman, 94 T.C. at 25.
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2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss4/7
HOME OFFICE DEDUCTION
perform the office functions of the business,2' Based on these factors, the
court held that Soliman's home office was his principal place of business.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
Tax Court's decision.' The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that
the Tax Court's decision rendered I.R.C. section 280A(c)(1)(A) meaning-
less.24 Instead, the court decided that the Tax Court's facts and circumstanc-
es test "more accurately reflect[ed] the purposes and requirements of section
280A."'  The court further held that the following factors weigh heavily in
finding that a home office is a principal place of business: "(1) the office in
the home is essential to the taxpayer's business; (2) [the taxpayer] spends a
substantial amount of time there; and (3) there is no other location available
for performance of the office functions of the business."
26
The United States Supreme Court reversed.' The Court reasoned that
to determine a taxpayer's principal place of business, a comparative analysis
of his business locations must be undertaken because "principal," by definition,
means "most important, consequential, or influential. 2  Since the test
espoused by the Court of Appeals failed to consider which business location
of the taxpayer is most significant, that test was overturned.29 The Court
21. Id at 29.
22. Id. For cases applying the Soliman test see Hamacher v. Commissioner, 94
T.C. 348 (1990); Kahaku v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1247 (1990); Shore v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 762 (1990). See also J. Martin Burke & Michael
K. Friel, The Home Office Deduction: Redefining the Principal Place of Business, 14
REv. TAX'N INDrvIDs. 373 (1990); Henri C. Pusker, Home Office Deductions: Some
Good News, 18 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 24 (1990); John C. Zimmerman, Abandonment
of the Focal Point Test for Office-in-Home Deductions, 68 TAxES 434 (1990); Mark
Levine, Note, Home Office Deductions: Deserving Taxpayers Finally Get a Break, 45
TAX LAW. 247 (1991); Kathleen Low, Note, Soliman v. Commissioner: Recent
Changes in the Tax Court's Treatment of the Home Office Deduction, 22 LoY. U. Cm.
L.J. 277 (1990).
23. Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
701 (1993).
24. Id. at 54. The Commissioner presumably was contending that using a facts
and circumstances inquiry in lieu of a comparative analysis of the taxpayer's business
locations makes the word "principal" in § 280A superfluous.
25. Id. at 55.
26. Id. at 54. Cf Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1988) (no
deduction under § 280A(c)(1)(A) where physician was provided access to a work area
at a hospital).
27. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 708.
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noted that no precise formula exists to determine whether a home office is the
taxpayer's principal place of business." Further, some situations may exist
in which there is no principal place of business." The Court then held that
"two primary considerations" should underlie the requisite comparative
analysis used to decide whether a home office is a taxpayer's principal place
of business: (1) The relative importance of the activities performed at each
business location; and (2) the time spent at each location. 2
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Status of the Home Office Deduction
Prior to Section 280A
Under I.R.C. section 162(a), a taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for
ordinary and necessary business expenses.3 The Tax Court determined the
deductibility of home office expenses under section 162(a) in Newi v.
Commissioner.' In Newi, the petitioner and his wife had rented a three
30. Id.
31. Id. at 707.
32. Id at 706.
33. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988). The text of § 162(a) reads as follows:
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business, including-
(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for
personal services actually rendered;
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals
and lodging other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant
under the circumstances) while away from home in the pursuit
of a trade or business; and
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition
to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or
business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is
not taking title or in which he has no equity.
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the place of residence of a Member
of Congress (including any Delegate and Resident Commissioner) within
the State, congressional district, or possession which he represents in
Congress shall be considered his home, but amounts expended by such
Members within each taxable year for living expenses shall not be
deductible for income tax purposes in excess of $3,000.
Id.
34. 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (1969), affd, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970). See
Mortimer M. Caplin & Richard M. Lent, Deducting Expenses Pertaining to Out-of-
(Vol. 58
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room apartment for a portion of the year and a four room apartment for the
remainder of the year." Each of these apartments had a room, separated
from the rest of the apartment by partitions and doors, that was used as a
study by the petitioner.36
The petitioner's occupation involved selling television time for the
American Broadcasting Company (ABC)." Each night, he would spend
about three hours in the study reviewing notes on his daily sales activities,
studying research materials and ratings, planning activities for the next day,
and viewing television advertisements of ABC and its competitors.3 The
study was not used for personal television viewing or entertainment.39 ABC
did not ask petitioner to use a portion of his home as an office; in fact, ABC's
offices were open for his use in the evening.4"
The petitioner deducted the rent, cleaning, and lighting expenses allocable
to his study on his federal income tax return for the calendar year.4 The
Commissioner disallowed these deductions because they did not constitute
ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162(a).42 The
Commissioner made this determination because the petitioner was not required
by his employer to maintain the home office, and an alternative office was
available for his use during the evening hours.43
The Tax Court overruled the Commissioner.4' The court held that the
term "ordinary," as used in section 162(a), distinguishes between expenses that
are currently deductible and those that are capital expenditures.4" The court
Town Residences Used as Business Accommodations, 58 J. TAX'N 270 (1983), for a
discussion of the relationship between § 162(a) and § 280A. See also Moller v. United
States, 721 F.2d 810 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984) (home office
deduction not allowed when taxpayer's activities did not rise to the level of a trade or
business under § 162(a)); Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980) (§ 280A
requires that the taxpayer's activities constitute a trade or business under § 162). For
a discussion of the tests for deductibility of home office expenditures prior to § 280A
see O'Connell v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 837 (1972), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
825 (1975).
35. Newi, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 688.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 687.




42. Id See supra note 33 for the text of § 162(a).
43. Newi, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 691.
44. Id.
45. Id. The Court cited Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 688-90 (1966)
in support of this proposition. For a consideration of the amount to be allowed as a
1993]
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then noted that the rent cleaning, and lighting expenses were clearly not
capital in nature.' The term "necessary" in section 162(a) was deemed by
the court to impose "only the minimal requirement that the contested
expenditure be 'appropriate and helpful' to the taxpayer's business."47 Since
the petitioner's home office was used for business purposes, the "appropriate
and helpful" standard set forth by the court was met.48 The court noted that
it would have reached the same result even if the home office had been used
for nonbusiness purposes on "rare and isolated occasions."49
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
decision of the Tax Court.50 The Second Circuit attempted to clarify the
scope of the Tax Court's decision in addressing the Commissioner's argument
that the "appropriate and helpful" test posited by the Tax Court "would open
the doors for a business deduction to any employee who would voluntarily
choose to engage in an activity at home which conceivably could be helpful
to his employer's business."5 The court noted that it would have been
"wholly impractical" for the taxpayer to return in the evening to his
employer's place of business because of the travail of nighttime travel in
Manhattan. 2 The court then said that using the study was probably the best
method available to accomplish the taxpayer's business objectives. 3
However, the court did not specify whether its finding that the home office
was the best method of achieving the taxpayer's business goals was a
prerequisite to deductibility; it merely found the Tax Court's decision to be
reasonable.5 4
As a result of Newi, a liberal standard for the deductibility of home office
expenses was put into play. 5 Most, if not all, business related activities are
"appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's business; otherwise, they would not
home office deduction see Gino v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976), cerl,
denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980); Browne
v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 723 (1980).
46. Newi, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 691. A capital expenditure is one that is "properly
attributable, through amortization, to later tax years when the capital asset becomes
income producing." Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974).
47. Newi, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 691. The Court cited Tellier, 383 U.S. at 690, as
support.
48. Newi, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 691.
49. Id





55. See Levine, supra note 22, at 250.
[Vol. 58
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be undertaken. Further, the Second Circuit's affirmance did little to narrow
the holding of the Tax Court. As most commuters can attest, travel to and
from the work site can be time consuming. Frequently, it will be more
efficient to work at home in the evening rather than make a second trip to the
office. The Second Circuit's emphasis on the extensive travel time re-
quired 6 rings of an efficiency standard. Thus, any time a taxpayer could
show that business related activities conducted at home were "appropriate and
helpful" and time efficient with respect to travel, the expenses would be
deductible under the standard declared by the Second Circuit.
The Tax Court broadened the reach of the "appropriate and helpful" test
in Bodzin v. Commissioner.57 In Bodzin, the petitioner was employed as an
attorney by the Internal Revenue Service. 8 Although he was not required
to work overtime by the Service, he frequently found it desirable to do so in
order to perform his work to the best of his abilities.5 9 He used a room in
his apartment as an office, in which he worked on matters assigned to him and
read about recent developments in tax law.' He found it more convenient
to work in his home office than to travel to and from work in the evening.6
On his federal income tax return, petitioner claimed the portion of the rent
allocable to his home office as a deduction under section 162(a). 2 The
Commissioner disallowed this deduction."
The Tax Court overturned the Commissioner" and held that even
though "the maintenance of the home office can be characterized as 'a matter
of convenience' due to the existence of duplicate employer-provided
facilities," the home office deduction may still be warranted. 5 If, however,
personal convenience is the primary reason for maintaining the office or if the
taxpayer is seeking to manufacture a deduction (i.e., acts in bad faith), the
deduction will be denied." Otherwise, if the deduction is appropriate and
helpful, it will be allowed.67
56. Newi, 432 F.2d at 1000.
57. 60 T.C. 820 (1973), rev'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 825 (1975).
58. Id at 821.
59. Id. at 822.
60. Id. at 823.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 824.
63. Id
64. Id. at 826.
65. Id. at 825-26.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.68
The court noted that the Internal Revenue building was always open and was
not a long distance from Bodzin's home.69 It then held that the rental
expense was a personal expense within the meaning of section 26270 and not
an ordinary and necessary business expense under section 162(a).7 The
court thus found it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the expenses
were "appropriate and helpful."'72 The court did not explain the reasoning
used in reaching its holding. However, it appears probable that it doubted the
sincerity of the taxpayer in claiming the deduction. The court likely believed
that since an office was readily accessible to him in the evening, there was
really no purpose in performing the work at home. The propriety of the
"appropriate and helpful" test was not questioned.
B. The Legislative Intent Behind Section 280A
The "appropriate and helpful" test used in determining the availability of
the home office deduction was "so fuzzy a standard [that] taxpayers could
claim the deduction on the flimsiest of grounds with no fear of a fraud
penalty, and thus could pocket a tax savings except in the unlikely event of
an audit."73  Under that test, nondeductible personal expenses could be
converted into deductible business expenses if it was "appropriate and helpful"
to perform some work related activities at home.74 Congress believed that
a more concrete standard was necessary to eliminate the potential for frivolous
deductions.75 The Senate Report accompanying section 280A stated that "the
'appropriate and helpful' test increases the inherent administrative problems
because both business and personal uses of the residence are involved and
68. Bodzin v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1979), cerl. denied, 423 U.S.
825 (1975).
69. Id. at 680.
70. I.R.C. § 262(a) (1988) provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall
be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.
Id
71. Bodzin, 509 F.2d at 681. See supra note 33 for the text of § 162(a).
72. Bodzin, 509 F.2d at 681.
73. Cadwallader v. Commissioner, 919 F.2d 1273, 1275 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'g 57
T.C.M. (CCH) 1030 (1989).
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substantiation of the time used for each of these activities is clearly a
subjective determination."76
As a result of these considerations, Congress decided to discard the
"appropriate and helpful" test. In its place, Congress enacted section 280A.77
Under section 280A, no deduction is allowed with respect to a dwelling unit
used by the taxpayer during the year as a residence.78 However, an
exception to this rule exists if a portion of the dwelling unit is used exclusive-
ly and on a regular basis as (1) the taxpayer's principal place of business,79
or (2) a place of business used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting
or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of business.8"
The language of section 280A,8 coupled with the legislative history,
82
76. Id
77. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 601, 90 Stat. 1520, 1569-72
(1976) (codified at I.R.C. § 280A (1988)). The pertinent portion of § 280A
provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE. Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the
case of a taxpayer who is an individual or an S corporation, no deduction
otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed with respect to the
use of a dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer during the taxable year
as a residence.
(c) EXCEPTIONS FOR CERTAIN BUSINESS OR RENTAL USE;
LIMITATION ON DEDUCTIONS FOR SUCH USE.
(1)CERTAIN BUSINESS USE. Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item
to the extent such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is
exclusively used on a regular basis-
(A) the principal place of business for any trade or business of the
taxpayer,
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or
customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of
his trade or business, or
(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached to the
dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business.
In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall apply only if the
exclusive use referred to in the preceding sentence is for the convenience
of the employer.
Id.
78. I.R.C. § 280A(a) (1988).
79. Id § 28OA(e)(1)(A).
80. Id § 280A(c)(1)(B). Cf Green v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir.
1983) (no deduction under § 280A(c)(1)(B) when home office used to receive
incoming phone calls from clients but no actual meetings with clients occurred in
home office).
81. See supra note 77 for the text of § 280A.
1993]
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indicate that Congress intended to constrict the availability of the home office
deduction. 3 The terms "exclusively" and on a "regular basis" appear self-
explanatory and have not caused courts any consternation. However, the
meaning of "principal place of business" is not readily apparent and the
legislative history does not define this term." Thus, the task of defining this
term has been left to the courts. As will be seen, judicial interpretations of the
term "principal place of business" have hardly been models of clarity,
C. Judicial Application of Section 280A
The Tax Court adopted the "focal point" test in Bale v. Commissioner"
to determine if a home office was a taxpayer's principal place of business.
The petitioner in Bate operated a hot dog stand approximately seven-tenths of
a mile from her residence.86 Because there was no room at the stand for
food preparation, she prepared the food at home. She also used a spare
bedroom in her home exclusively to perform paperwork."
The Tax Court disallowed a deduction for the home office expenses.88
The court held that by "principal place of business," Congress had in mind the
focal point of the taxpayer's activities.89 The focal point of the business is
the place where goods or services are delivered.' Petitioner's principal place
of business, therefore, was the hot dog stand, not her home office.9
Under the focal point test, the place where goods or services are delivered
is dispositive. No allowance is made for taxpayers who spend the majority of
their working hours in their home offices, yet provide services or generate
82. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
83. See Edward J. De Guardiola, Home Office Deductions Under the New Section
280A of the Internal Revenue Code, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 129 (1978); Linda Moore
Kaplan, Home Offlce Deductionsfor "Vacation Homes" Under the Tax Reform Act of
1976, 63 A.B.A. J. 1302 (1977); Michael B. Lang, When a House is Not Entirely a
Home: Deductions Under Internal Revenue Code §280A for Home Offices, Vacation
Homes, Etc., 1981 UTAH L. REv. 275; Neil M. Goff, Comment, Commingling Business
and Personal Use of Real Property: Severe Restrictions Under the 1976 Tax Reform
Act, 13 GONz. L. REv. 493 (1978).
84. S. REP. No. 938, supra note 74, at 147, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3579-
80.
85. 74 T.C. 105 (1980).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 106.
88. Id at 111.
89. Id. at 109. See Jackson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696, 700 (1981) (principal
place of business is focal point of business activity).
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revenues elsewhere. Drucker v. Commissioner" is illustrative. In Drucker,
the Tax Court denied a home office deduction to a concert musician who used
a room in his apartment exclusively for practicing his skills, even though he
spent more time practicing at home than he did on stage.93 The court noted
that although the petitioner was required to practice to maintain his skills, it
was not a "condition of employment."'94 Under the focal point test, the
concert stage was where "services" were provided.95 Thus, the court held
that the place where the taxpayer performed as a musician was his principal
place of business.'
The Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court's holding.97 The Second
Circuit reasoned that the home office was the focal point of the taxpayer's
business both in time and importance because the performances were made
possible only by the practice at home.9" Because the place of performance
was irrelevant so long as he was prepared and most of his preparation
occurred at home, his home office was his principal place of business under
section 280A.9
The Second Circuit did not overrule the focal point test, it merely refined
it by adding a new component-time. Under this version of the focal point
test, the taxpayer's principal place of business is the place where goods or
services are provided or, if elsewhere, the place where most of the work is
performed, provided the work is essential to the taxpayer's business. The
Second Circuit revisited this version of the focal point test in Weissman v.
Commissioner.00
In Weissman, the taxpayer was a professor at City College of the City
University of New York."'1 He spent twenty percent of his working hours
at the university and eighty percent at his home office.t" His home office
was used exclusively for research and writing." 3 Although he was provided
with an office on campus, he had to share it with several other professors, and
it did not have a typewriter. 1"4
92. 79 T.C. 605 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
93. Id at 615.
94. Id at 607-08.
95. Id at 614.
96. Id at 613-14.
97. Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1983).
98. Id. at 69.
99. Id.
100. 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'g47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520 (1983).






Sullivan: Sullivan: Continuing Saga of the Home Office
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
MISOURI LAW REVIEW
The Tax Court ruled that the focal point of the taxpayer's activities, and
thus his principal place of business, was at the university.' 5 The court
reasoned that the taxpayer provided services, i.e., taught, met with students,
and graded examinations, at the university. 6 Thus, even though he actually
spent more time at home, his principal place of business was at the universi-
ty.107
The Second.Circuit rejected the Tax Court's application of the focal point
test to Weissman."0 8 The couraid that "the 'focal point' approach creates a
risk of shifting attention to the place where a taxpayer's work is more visible,
instead of the place where the dominant portion of the work is
performed."" 9 Neverthel, the court did not discard the focal point approach.
It recognized that the focal point test may be appropriate in many cases,"0
but "when a taxpayer's occupation involves two very distinct yet related
activities, such as... writing and teaching," the focal point test should not be
used.'
Although the Second Circuit purported to reject the focal point test as it
applied to the facts in Weissman," in actuality it applied the refined version
of that test it developed in Drucker."' Under this test, the taxpayer's
principal place of business is where goods or services are provided. If,
however, the majority of the taxpayer's time is spent at a location other than
where goods or services are provided, the principal place of business is where
the majority of the work essential to the business is performed. In determin-
ing the importance of the work performed at this location, the following
105. Weissman v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520, 522 (1983). See also
Dudley v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1988) (mem.) (no deduction for a
college professor who was provided with office space on campus); Cousino v.
Commissioner, 679 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982)
(home office not principal place of business when used by teacher to grade papers);
Weightman v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 104 (1981) (college professor's home
office was not principal place of business when used for research activities). Cf.
Cadwallader v. Commissioner, 919 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1990) (although professor's
home office was his principal place of business, it was not used for the employer's
convenience and a § 280A deduction was denied). See generally Paul E. Fiorelli, The
Home Office Deduction after Weissman: New Hope for Faculty? 24 AM. Bus. L.J.
377 (1986).
106. Weissman, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) at 522.
107. Id




112. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
113. See supra text following note 99.
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factors should be considered: (1) the nature of the business activities; (2) the
attributes of the space in which such activities can be conducted; and (3) the
practical necessity of using a home office to carry out such activities."'
The Seventh Circuit adopted this version of the focal point test in Meiers
v. Commissioner."5  In Meiers, the taxpayers operated a self-service
laundromat." 6  Mrs. Meiers managed the laundromat," 7 and spent
approximately one hour per day at the laundromat and two hours a day in a
home office used exclusively for business purposes."" The Tax Court
applied the focal point test as stated in Baie"9 and determined that the focal
point of the taxpayers' business was at the laundromat.20
In reversing the Tax Court, the Seventh Circuit said that "the focal point
test as applied by the Tax Court places undue emphasis upon the location
where goods or services are provided to customers and income is generated,
not necessarily where work is predominantly performed."' The court held
that the time spent in the home office should be a major consideration in
determining if it is a taxpayer's principal place of business." The court
also held that time is not necessarily the only factor to consider."n In
appropriate cases, the following factors may "weigh in the balance:" (1) The
importance of the functions performed in the home office; (2) the business
necessity of the home office; and (3) the expenditures made to establish a
home office.'24 These factors, like those used by the Second Circuit' 25
apparently are used to determine the importance of the home office. The
court did not reject the focal point test entirely; rather, it added components
to it in order to effect what it thought was a proper result. The version of the
focal point test used by the court in Meiers is virtually indistinguishable from
the test used by the Second Circuit.'26
114. Weissman, 751 F.2d at 514-15.
115. 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'g49 T.C.M. (CCH) 136 (1984).
116. Id at 76.
117. Id. Her duties as manager included drafting work schedules, collecting
money from the machines, assisting customers, and performing bookkeeping and other
similar tasks. Id.
118. Id It was undisputed that the taxpayers had made a legitimate business
decision not to have office space in the laundromat. Id
119. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.





125. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
126. See text following note 99.
19931 1001
13
Sullivan: Sullivan: Continuing Saga of the Home Office
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
As is clear from the preceding discussion, case law under section 280A
developed two tests for determining a taxpayer's principal place of business.
The Tax Court continued to adhere to the focal point test it promulgated in
Bale.27 The Second and Seventh Circuits expounded a second test, dubbed
by one commentator as the "dominant portion of the work test.0"1 These
two tests were primarily applied to allow deductions to taxpayers who ran
businesses from their homes 29 and to employees who did most of their
work at home.130 It was unclear whether these tests.precluded deductions
by taxpayers who were not provided with offices by their employers, who
performed a significant amount (although not a majority) of work in their
home offices, and whose home offices were essential to their businesses.
Arguably, the congressional intent' behind section 280A is not contravened
by allowing the deductions in such situations, because the potential for abuse
inherent in the "appropriate and helpful" standard is not present.3 2
127. See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of Baie. The
Tax Court did not abandon the focal point test until it decided Soliman. See Soliman,
94 T.C. at 25-26. See also Proskauer v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 679 (1983)
(court intimated, but did not hold, that a home office was not the principal place of
business under the focal point test because separate office space was maintained);
Trussel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 190 (1982) (housing court judge's home
office was not his principal place of business even though he had no office at the
courthouse); Anderson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1305 (1982) (under the
focal point test, a nurse-anesthetist's home office was not the principal place of
business within the meaning of § 280A).
128. Levine, supra note 22, at 253-54. As stated earlier, this test essentially is
the focal point test with an exception being made if the taxpayer spends the majority
of his time in the home office. See supra text following note 97. See also Eugene A.
Gargaro Jr., Does Your Law Office At Home Satisfy the Business Use Tests Under
IR.C. Sec. 280A?, 63 MICH. ST. B.J. 570 (1984); Paula W. Kretschmar & James G.
Bond, Home Office Deductions: Second Circuit Relaxes Standard, 63 TAXES 435
(1985); John Malloy and Lambert Blank Jr., The IncreasingAvailability of the Home
Office Deduction and the Related Implications of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 65
TAXES 233 (1987); Timothy M. Mulligan, The Tax Ramifications of the Business Use
of a Home, 55 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 105 (1984); John P. Napoli, Home Office
Deductions: Recent Decisions Make Up a Mixed Bagfor Taxpayers, 10 REV. TAX'N
INDIvIDs. 228 (1986); Stanley Rier, Tax Ideas: A House is a Home is an Office, 15
REAL EST. L.J. 157 (1986).
129. See, e.g., Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986); Baie v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 105 (1980).
130. See, e.g., Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984); Drucker
v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
131. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
legislative history of § 280A.
132. See Newi, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 691, for a discussion of the "appropriate and
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The majority' first considered the use of the phrase "principal place
of business" in section 280A.' The Court noted that when Congress
enacted section 280A, it intended to narrow the scope of the home office deduc-
tion.'35 Since "principal" is defined as "most important, consequential, or
influential,"'36 a comparison of the taxpayer's business locations must be
undertaken.'37 The Court of Appeals was therefore incorrect in suggesting
that section 280A allows a deduction whenever a home office can be
characterized as legitimate.'
Under the Court of Appeals' test, a home office is a taxpayer's principal
place of business whenever it is essential to the taxpayer's business, no
alternative space is available, and the taxpayer spends a substantial amount of
time there.'39  This test is similar to the "appropriate and helpful" test
because it ignores whether the home office is more significant to the
taxpayer's business than every other place of business. 4 ' Since section
280A refers to a taxpayer's "principal place of business," as opposed to
"principal office," the Court ruled that the Fourth Circuit's test must be
rejected.'
Two primary considerations exist in determining whether a taxpayer's
home office is the principal place of business: (1) The relative importance of
the activities performed at each business location; and (2) the time spent at
each location. 2 The Court did not announce an objective formula to apply
to all cases.' It noted that the facts in each case will vary, making it
difficult to develop a bright line test.'"
helpful" standard. See also Levine, supra note 22, at 259.
133. Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, and was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmnun, O'Connor, and Souter.
134. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 705-06.
135. Id.
136. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1802 (1971).
137. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 706.
138. Id. See Soliman, 935 F.2d at 54-55.
139. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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Determining the relative importance of the activities performed at each
business location first requires an objective description of the business in
question. 45 In each particular business, a pattern is likely to develop in
which certain activities are of more significance than others. 46 The place
where client contact or delivery of goods or services occurs is likely to be an
important indicator of the taxpayer's principal place of business. 47  The
Court noted that although these factors were similar to the focal point test,
they are not determinative in every case.' Although the Court declined to
adopt the focal point test, it said that the place where goods and services are
delivered should be "given great weight" in assessing the importance of the
business functions performed.
49
This reasoning is strengthened when one considers that section
280A(c)(1)(B) allows a home office deduction whenever it is used exclusively
and on a regular basis "by patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing
with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business.""'5 Since
a deduction is allowed in these circumstances regardless of whether the home
office is the taxpayer's principal place of business, Congress intended for these
factors to have significance in determining the nature and function of the
business.' The Court concluded, however, that these factors were not
dispositive'5
The time spent at each business location is to be considered in conjunc-
tion with an analysis of the importance of the activities performed at each
business location. 3 Time is of particular importance when the analysis of
the activities performed at each business location does not give a clear answer
to the principal place of business inquiry." An example of such a situation
is when income-generating activities are performed both at the home office
and at another business location."'
The Court did not regard the necessity of the functions performed at
home as having much weight in determining whether a home office deduction






150. Id See supra note 77 for the text of § 280A.
151. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 707.
152. Id
153. Id. at 707-08.





Missouri Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss4/7
HOME OFFICE DEDUCTION
transactions, each step is essential."i 7 Necessity should be used to assess the
relative importance of the functions performed at each business location; it
should not be controlling in and of itself."'
Whether a home office is the only location available to perform particular
business functions has no bearing on the principal place of business inqui-
ry."9 Under section 280A, this factor is relevant only in determining if an
employee's use of a home office is "for the convenience of the employer." 
6
0
Conversely, if the comparative analysis points to a home office as the




The Court next considered the relative importance of the business
functions performed by Soliman at each of his business locations.162 The
Court determined that treating patients was the essence of Soliman's
profession. 63 Although the home office activities were necessary to
Soliman's profession, they were of less importance than treating patients."6
Further, he spent substantially less time in his home office than he did treating
patients. 65 Based on these considerations, the Court reversed the judgment
of the Fourth Circuit and held that Soliman's deduction for his home office
was not allowed under section 280A."6
B. Concurrences
Justice Blackmnunjoined the majority's opinion, but wrote separately to
emphasize that deductions are a matter of legislative grace, not of right. 67




160. Id The Court was referring to the portion of § 280A which disallows an
employee's home office deduction unless it is "for the convenience of the employer."
See supra note 77 for the text of § 280A.
161. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 707.
162. Id. at 708.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id Soliman spent ten to fifteen hours per week in his home office and thirty
to thirty-five hours per week in his business office. Id
166. Id
167. Id (Blackmun, J., concurring). He cited Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S.
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the comparative analysis required by the majority.6 ' He concluded that if
tax policy demands a different result, Congress should change the wording of
section 280A. 69
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, also concurred in the holding
reached by the majority. 7 He believed, however, that the "two-factor
inquiry" announced by the majority did not provide "clear guidance" to lower
courts."' Justice Thomas concluded that the focal point test was adequate
in the vast majority of cases, including the one under consideration. 72
Justice Thomas said that the two-factor inquiry announced by the majority
should be used "only in the small minority of cases where the home office is
one of several locations where goods or services are delivered, and thus also
one of the multiple locations where income is generated."'73
Although "principal" does suggest "most important," Justice Thomas
argued that the comparative analysis used by the majority is not necessary in
all cases." Instead, if a single location exists at which goods or services
are delivered, it should be assumed that that location is the taxpayer's
principal place of business.'75 When the focal point test does not yield a
single principal place of business, the comparative analysis announced by the
majority should then be used to resolve the issue.
C. Dissent
Justice Stevens dissented.' He concluded that the relevance given by
the majority to the place where goods or services are delivered rendered
section 280A(c)(1)(B) superfluous.' Because section 280A(c)(1)(B) allows
a home office deduction whenever it is used for meeting patients in the
ordinary course of business, 79 this factor is irrelevant in determining if a
home office is a taxpayer's principal place of business under section
280A(c)(1)(A).' Instead, Justice Stevens believed that "[t]he only place
168. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 708-09 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 709.







177. Id. at 711 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. See supra note 77 for the text of § 280A(c)(1)(B).
180. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 713-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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where a business is managed is fairly described as its 'principal' place of
business." ' Furthermore, "a principal place of business is a place main-
tained by or (in the rare case) for the business."'1 2 Applying section 280A
to Soliman, Justice Stevens concluded that Soliman's home office was his only
place of business; therefore it was his principal place of business.'
V. COMMENT
The legislative history is silent as to the meaning of the phrase "principal
place of business" in section 280A, as discussed earlier.' Nevertheless,
Congress expressly for intended section 280A to provide a definite standard
for the deductibility of home office expenses.8 5 and to narrow the scope of
the deduction by eliminating the "appropriate and helpful" standard.8 6
Further, section 280A is structured so that deductions are not allowed for
home office expenses, generally. 7  Section 280A(c)(1) provides an
exception to the general rule of nondeductibility by listing three instances in
which home office expenses can be deducted.' Congress' delineation of
a limited number of exceptions to the general rule of nondeductibility leads
to the conclusion that the phrase "principal place of business" should not be
given an expansive interpretation. Giving wide latitude to this phrase would
frustrate Congress' intent to provide a narrow exception to the nondeductibili-
ty of home office expenses.
The test for determining a taxpayer's principal place of business under
section 280A should comport with Congress' intent and with the language of
the statute. Placing the qualifier "principal" in the phrase "principal place of
business" was Congress' way of restricting the availablilty of the home office
deduction. As noted by the Court, "principal" means "most important
consequential, or influential."'8 9  Thus, a taxpayer's principal place of
business under section 280A is the place where the most important business
activities occur. Because the most important function of any business is to
earn a profit, the place where profit-generating activities occur should be the
taxpayer's principal place of business. A business earns profits by providing
goods or services. Therefore, under section 280A, the place where goods or
181. Id. at 71S.
182. Id
183. Id
184. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 77 for the text of § 280A.
188. See supra note 77 for the text of § 280A(c)(1).
189. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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services are provided should be the taxpayer's principal place of business. If
the taxpayer provides goods or services at more than one location, the
principal place of business should be the place where the most time is spent
because that location is likely to be the most important (otherwise, more time
would be spent elsewhere since businesses seek to maximize profits). The
Supreme Court was therefore correct in overturning the Fourth Circuit's facts
and circumstances test for determining whether a home office is a taxpayer's
principal place of business. The Court was also correct when it noted that the
facts and circumstances test is quite similar to the pre-section 280A "appropri-
ate and helpful" standard.
Under the Fourth Circuit's approach, a home office is a taxpayer's
principal place of business whenever it is essential to the business, no
alternative space is available, and substantial time is spent there."9° The
only substantive difference between this approach and the "appropriate and
helpful" standard is that the availability of alternative space is not a consider-
ation under the latter.'9 ' Whether a home office is essential to a taxpayer's
business depends on whether the work undertaken there is essential to the
business. It is a safe assumption that nearly all work performed in home
offices is essential to the business."' 2 Most taxpayers are not inclined to
work at home unless their occupation compels it. The same reasoning applies
to the "appropriate and helpful" standard: a taxpayer probably will not work
in a home office if it is not "appropriate and helpful" to his business. 93
Although the "appropriate and helpful" standard does not explicitly
require that substantial time be spent in the home office, it will nearly always
be the case that substantial time is in fact spent there (or is claimed to have
been spent there) if the taxpayer claims a home office deduction. If an
insignificant amount of time is spent in a home office, the dollar amount of
the deduction will be negligible. 94 The Fourth Circuit did not define
"substantial time" as used in its facts and circumstances test. It is not difficult
to imagine a slew of litigation on this issue. Moreover, even if a standard did
190. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
191. See Newi, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 691, for a discussion of the "appropriate and
helpful" standard.
192. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
193. See text following note 54.
194. For example, Soliman spent 750 hours during 1983 in his home office, and
the amount of his deduction was $1,259, for an average of $1.68 per hour. Under
§ 67(a), home office expenses of an employee are subject to a floor of 2% of adjusted
gross income (AGI). For an individual with an AGI of $50,000, the deduction must
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exist, it would be quite simple for taxpayers to simply "fudge" the amount of
time actually spent in the home office.'
Because the Fourth Circuit's approach took into account the availability
of alternative office space, 9 ' the effect of its holding is to allow a home
office deduction whenever the work performed there is "appropriate and
helpful" to the taxpayer's business and no other office space is available. This
approach violates Congress' intent in enacting section 280A. Congress
attempted to eliminate the "appropriate and helpful" standard'97 with no
intention of retaining it in situations where no alternative office space is
available. Thus, the Supreme Court properly rejected the Fourth Circuit's
approach,
Although the Court correctly discerned the shortcomings in the approach
used by the Fourth Circuit,'98 it promulgated a comparative test which
effectively is a variation of the "dominant portion of the work" test.'99 The
comparative test consists of two prongs: (1) assessing the relative significance
of the work performed at each business location; and (2) comparing the time
spent at each business location." °
In determining the relative significance of the work performed at each
location, the Court said that the place where goods or services are delivered
must be "given great weight."' '2 It qualified this statement by adding that
no one test is determinative in each case. 2 It strains the imagination,
however, to conceive of a business location that has more significance than the
place where goods or services are delivered.2 3 Thus, the most significant
business location under the first prong of the Court's test will always be the
place where goods or services are exchanged for income. Despite its
disavowals," 4 the Court actually adopted the focal point test for measuring
195. For example, a time log could be kept in which the hours worked in the
home office were entered to neatly correspond with whatever judicial definition of
"substantial time" existed.
196. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text for the Court's rejection of
the Fourth Circuit's approach.
199. See supra text accompanying note 114 and notes 121-26 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the "dominant portion of the work" test.
200. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 706.
201. Id
202. Id
203. See supra text following note 189.
204. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 706.
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the relative significance of the work performed at each location. The
dominant portion of the work test includes this very component.0 5
The second prong of the comparative test is the time spent at each
business location.2' Although not mentioned by the Court, it is implicit that
the time spent at each business location be essential to the business, which it
nearly always will be.2'7 Similarly, the dominant portion of the work test
includes a consideration of time, provided that the time spent at each location
is essential to the taxpayer's trade or business. Thus, the comparative test
promulgated by the Supreme Court consists of essentially the same compo-
nents as the dominant portion of the work test.
The only difference between the comparative test and the dominant
portion of the work test is in how the components interrelate. As illustrated
in Weissman, a taxpayer's principal place of business under the dominant
portion of the work test is the place where goods or services are provided
unless more time is spent at another business location and that time is essential
to the business.2° In such a case, the latter is the taxpayer's principal place
of business.
Under the comparative test, a taxpayer's principal place of business is the
place where goods or services are provided and where the most time is
spent.10 Unlike the dominant portion of the work test, under which the
relationship between delivery of goods/services and time is disjunctive, 1
the Court linked these two components conjunctively. 22 In this particular
case, the test worked because Soliman spent most of his time at the hospitals
and provided services there. However, this test has an inherent flaw because
it contains no mechanism to resolve a situation in which the taxpayer provides
goods or services at one location but spends more time at the home office.213
In such situations, lower courts and taxpayers are presented with no guidance
and the deductibility of home office expenses is once again up in the air.
While the Supreme Court's desire to apply section 280A as it was written
is appropriate, the Soliman decision will only obfuscate the area of home
office deductions. The comparative test is a variation of the dominant portion
205. See supra text following note 113.
206. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 706.
207. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
208. See supra text following note 113.
209. See supra text following note 113.
210. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 706.
211. See supra text following note 113.
212. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
213. See Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 710-11 (Thomas, J., concurring). Cf Weissman
v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520 (1983), rev'd, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984);
and Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
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of the work test. The dominant portion of the work test, in turn, is a variation
of the focal point test.214 Ascertainable standards should guide this area, not
case-by-case litigation.215
The Court should have adopted the standard advocated by Justice
Thomas. Under that standard, a taxpayer's principal place of business is the
place where goods or services are provided, i.e., the focal point test.2"6 If
the focal point inquiry yields more than one principal place of business, the
comparative analysis declared by the majority is used to resolve the con-
flict." ' The advantages of this approach, as well as the weaknesses of the
comparative test and the dominant portion of the work test, will be demon-
strated by the following example, which is a slight variation of the facts in
Soliman.
Assume Soliman spent sixty percent of his time in his home office. He
used the home office exclusively and on a regular basis for business functions.
Assume also that he spent thirty percent of his time at Hospital 1 and ten
percent of his time at Hospital 2.
Under the dominant portion of the work test, Soliman's home office is
his principal place of business. Although he provides services elsewhere, he
spends the majority of his time in his home office performing work that is
essential to his business. As can be seen, the dominant portion of the work
test attaches too much weight to time. His business is performing anesthesiol-
ogy. He practices his profession at the hospitals, and he is paid there. If he
did not work at the hospitals, he would not get paid. Thus, it is quite
reasonable to conclude that one of the hospitals, not his home office, is truly
his principal place of business.
Under the comparative test, Soliman's principal place of business cannot
be determined. The first prong of the test, assessing the relative significance
of the work performed at each location (i.e., the focal point test), suggests that
one of the hospitals is his principal place of business. The second prong, time
spent at each location, indicates that his home office is his principal place of
business because he spends more time there than at both hospitals combined.
The Court did not set forth any escape hatch to resolve this dilemma. Thus,
a facts and circumstances inquiry, with all of its attendant uncertainties, is
necessary.
Under Justice Thomas's approach, Soliman's principal place of business
is Hospital 1. The initial step in the inquiry is to apply the focal point test.
That test results in a finding that services are provided at Hospital 1 and
Hospital 2. Since two potential principal places of business exist, a compara-
214. See supra text following note 113.
215. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 22, at 281 n.7.
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tive analysis is performed. Because the relative importance of the work
performed at each location has already been assessed by the focal point test,
the only remaining consideration is the time spent at each location. Three
times as much time is spent at Hospital 1 than at Hospital 2. Therefore,
Hospital 1 is Soliman's principal place of business.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the focal point test provides a rigid standard for the deductibili-
ty of home office expenses, it has the advantage of predictability. Moreover,
it is beyond peradventure that "deductions are a matter of [legislative] grace
and Congress can, of course, disallow them as it chooses.0 1 1 When it
enacted section 280A, Congress intended to provide definitive standards so as
to narrow the scope of the home office deduction.19 The focal point test
is consistent with that intent. When the taxpayer provides goods or services
at more than one location, the approach recommended by Justice Thomas"0
easily resolves the conflict. The majority opinion in Soliman will only lead
to more piecemeal litigation on the deductibility of home office expenses."
Taxpayers deserve a bright-line standard for determining when home office
expenses are deductible. Since the Supreme Court is unable to provide such
a standard, Congress should define the phrase "principal place of business" in
section 280A to eliminate the uncertainty surrounding home office deductions.
J. PATRICK SULLIVAN
218. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958).
219. S. REP. No. 938, supra note 74, at 147, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3577-80.
220. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 709 (Thomas, J., concurring).
221. For the understandably nonplused reaction of practioners to the Soliman
decision, see Michael M. & Susan L. Megaard, Supreme Court Narrows Home Office
Deductions in Soliman, 78 J. TAX'N 132 (1993) (concluding that the state of the law
remains in flux after Soliman). For planning considerations, see I.R.S. Notice 93-12,
1993-8 I.R.B. 46; Sandra K. Miller, Com. v. Soliman: Supreme Court Unduly
Restricts Home Office Deductions, 71 TAXES 152 (1993).
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